Recent literature on the role of patents in shaping competition between incumbents and new entrants shows mixed evidence, as patents can discourage entry into markets but may also encourage potential entrants by increasing profitability from research and development. The increasing use of patents as strategic weapons motivates this investigation of the impact of innovation on competition. In a case study of US pharmaceutical cardiovascular submarkets over the period 1988-1998, we use a panel probit model to study the impact of a firm's patents and rivals' patents in the firm's decision to launch new products. Our results show that the number of a firm's lagged patents encourages the firm's entry with new products, while rivals' initial stock of patents discourages entry, but more recent patents promote entry by opening new technological opportunities.
Introduction
This paper focuses on the impact of innovation on entry into six US cardiovascular pharmaceutical submarkets over the period [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] . In particular, the paper sheds light on innovation's impact on competition, where competition is measured as the probability that a company will launch additional products or a first product (i.e. greenfield entry) into a specific submarket.
The analysis of competition among firms is one of the key topics in IO 3 , and several measures of competition, including the number of companies (Netz and Taylor, 2002 ) and the Lerner Index who stimulated interest in innovation and entry, we measure competition as the probability of product launches (greenfield or not) into a specific submarket 4 . Cockburn and MacGarvie (2011) investigated the role of patents in launching new products in the software market and found a positive correlation between firms' patent holdings and their new product launches. They also reemphasized the role of patents as barriers to entry, while other literature has pointed out the role of patents as an indicator of innovation success, technological opportunity, and innovative capabilities (e.g. Nerkar and Roberts, 2004) . The launch of products into a submarket also assumes significant importance in investigations of competition because product launches can be used as a proxy for market openness (Kyle, 2007) .
Following Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005) , we use patents 5 as a measure of innovation.
According to Hall et al. (2005, p. 17) , patents have long been recognized as a rich data source for the study of innovation and technical change, but the traditional view of patents as indicators of innovation has been changing because of their increasing strategic role (Boldrin and Levine, 2013) 6 ; as Bessel and Hunt (2007) and Rentocchini (2011) pointed out, some patents have become strategic instruments with which to block rivals, extract licensing revenues or do crosslicensing, rather than instruments through which to innovate. Therefore, patents are not exclusively instruments that guarantee ownership of the outcomes of research and development (R&D). Many firms acquire large portfolios of patents "even where the primary motivation for 3 IO is the acronym for Industrial Organization. 4 The first author to define submarkets as technical trajectory was Dosi (1982) . 5 Regarding this point, we quote Gallini (2002) . 6 As Kyle (2007, p. 88) stated, "Competition usually results in lower prices, and given the widespread concern about the cost of pharmaceuticals, it is valuable to know what impedes further entry into a market." If a company can launch into a market or submarket a new product that is vertically or horizontally differentiated, the barriers to entry in that market are low.
doing this goes beyond the potential to exclude competitors" (Cockburn and MacGarvie, 2011) , and the phenomenon of such patent "thickets" is assuming increasing importance in many markets (Cockburn and MacGarvie, 2009 ).
The analysis of patents' effect on competition at the submarket level could add new elements to the debate. Our study analyzes the impact of both the firm's and its competitors' patents on a product launch in a given submarket. This analysis helps to reveal whether patents signal fear of the competition (the "market-stealing effect") or disclose information or signal market dynamism (the "spillover effect").
With a "market-stealing effect," patents generate property rights that give their owners an advantage in the industry and that patents act as barriers to entry for competitors' products. With a "spillover effect," a rival's patent opens new technological opportunities for firms in the same industry, as "the disclosure of innovation by a rival through patenting may provide information on competition and innovation and found an inverted-U-shaped relationship between the number of patents (as a measure of innovation) and the level of competition (measured by the Lerner Index). Although it also emphasizes this bi-directionality, most of the literature has focused on the impact of competition (market structure) on innovation. However, given the presence of feedback effects (e.g. Jaffe, 2000; Hall and Harho, 2012), this paper seeks evidence of innovation's effect on competition, measured by the market's openness (i.e. the probability of being able to launch a new product into a submarket), and seeks to identify the impact of a firm's own patents and that of its competitors' patents on the decision to launch new products into a submarket.
On the theoretical side, the most important contribution regarding the impact of innovation on a market's structure belongs to Sutton (1998), who showed how the level of innovation can modify a market's structure and level of competition. Sutton 9 (1998) found that both horizontal and vertical differentiation take place in each submarket, so the number and quality of products launched depends on which kind of differentiation prevails: When horizontal differentiation prevails, the number of products is higher, regardless of quality; when vertical differentiation prevails, quality of new products launched is higher than the average level of quality in that submarket, so, the number of products is lower.
The company's decision to launching new products into various submarkets affects the company's share of the submarkets, while its share of the global market depends on the strength or weakness of the links among submarkets, explained by the effectiveness of R&D on the demand side and by economies of scope on the supply side 10 .
From an empirical point of view, the investigation of patents' effects on product launches is motivated by companies' increasing strategic use of patents (Bessel and Hunt, 2007; Rentocchini, 2011) and by the debate on intellectual property rights' effect in promoting innovation (Boldrin and Levine, 2013 pointing out a two-fold effect of patents: a "market-stealing effect" and a "spillover effect."
9 See chapter 1 of Sutton(1998). 10 Specifically, Sutton (1998) stated that the global level of market concentration is measured by the largest firm concentration ratio (CR1), which depends on the links among submarkets: stronger links increase the CR1 in the global market. The strength of the links among the submarkets are determined by aspects of technology and taste, where the technology side pertains to vertical differentiation, and the taste side pertains to horizontal differentiation. Horizontal differentiation also takes place in the pharmaceutical section because patients or doctors prefer certain drugs over others based on their side effects.
The current literature has not generally taken into account the role of a firm's own patents and those of its competitors in new product launches; although one McGahan and Silverman (2006) is one of the few exceptions, they studied the effect of rivals' patents on the focal firm's value, not on the level of competition. This paper's submarket-level analysis of the impact of a firm's own patents and those of its rivals on the entry decision is a step forward. With the assignment of each company's patents to a specific pharmaceutical submarket, this analysis measures patents' role as either a barrier to entry or a way to disclose information to competitors in the submarkets.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
The primary source of data is the IMS Health dataset, from which we obtained annual sales for all the companies active in the pharmaceutical market in the United States from 1988 to 1998 11 .
The dataset refers to the sales of any product offered for purchase, classified according to the Anatomical Therapeutical Classification (ATC), with a breakdown up to the 3-digit level 12 , allowing us to identify the effects of competition, capture companies' heterogeneity, and reproduce the analysis at the same level as that adopted by the antitrust authorities. The sales in real value were obtained using the US gross domestic product (GDP) deflator. We also used The available patent data refer to only six of the nine 3-digit subsectors that belong to section "C Cardiovascular system" of the ATC classification. The subsections considered are listed in Table 1 . In terms of average sales during our observation period, the submarkets listed in Table 1 represent about 20 percent of the pharmaceutical sector, so they are a valid sample for study.
Patterns have emerged in the recent past that could motivate the use of a more updated dataset, but the paper is sufficiently general that it doesn't depend on whether the period of investigation is recent 14 . The cost of finding and developing new drugs has changed but remains 11 Data collected by IMS Health was obtained by one of the authors during research conducted at the University of Siena, while working on the EPRIS Project. 12 www.whocc.no/atc (ddd index).
13
For a detailed description, see http://db.kites.unibocconi.it/ high, so further investigation with an updated dataset will be useful, but our analysis can establish a case study for other pharmaceutical submarkets and manufacturing sectors with similar characteristics (i.e. high entry costs). The role of a firm's own patents and those of its competitors in the success of new product launches will continue to be in need of further study.
Investing in new pharmaceutical products is appealing even though the success of newly developed products is highly uncertain given the high R&D investment required for all drugs.
Acemouglu and Linn (2004), who analyzed the effect of market size on new drugs' market entry, pointed out that a 1 percent increase in the market size for a drug category leads to a 4 to 6 percent increase in the number of new drugs introduced to the market.
We use patent data to gain information about the firms in a specific submarket. However, while patents can be easily assigned to firms, the IPC patent classification and the ATC classification for the product sold do not necessarily correspond, so we cannot necessarily associate each firm's patents to a specific 3-digit ATC class. Therefore, we used information from the between 1987 and 1998 that are associated with the products classified in that submarket 15 .
Then we used the patent numbers to associate each patent with its applicant. During the period covered by our data, thirty-six companies operated in the submarkets under consideration (Table 1) , although the companies often operated in more than one subsector, as shown in Table 2 . The original IMS Health dataset contains annual sales for all pharmaceutical products in each submarket, considered separately by presentation (e.g. tablets, ampules), quantity of the active ingredient (e.g. 250 mg, 500 mg), and so on. We based the identification of the various products on a drug code supplied by IMS Health. For example, in the 3-digit subsector in Table 1 , the IMS Health dataset contains 190 drug codes. Then we obtained the sales of a specific product by summing at the company level for each specific submarket and for each year the sales of all the pharmaceutical items in the dataset that were identified by the same code.
Since we study the effect of patents on international companies' decisions to launch new products into particular submarkets, we defined the Entry event, defined as occurring when the sales for at least one drug code for a given company becomes greater than zero. Entry can refer to a greenfield entry (i.e. when a company did not previously have other products in that submarket) or an expansion of the range of products a company offers. Thus, we do not consider the number of single new products a company launches but the entry decision to introduce one or more products into a submarket by a company i at time t. As a result, our unit of analysis is "companies per submarket"; in other words, our observations are the sales of company i in submarket j at time t. Since not all of the companies are in all of the submarkets, our dataset contains 91 units of analysis and 1,092 observations. The number of entry decisions by submarket in the period considered and the number of observations are reported in Table 2 .
Submarkets C10A, C2A, and C3A have the most entries, but submarket C3A has the highest number of product launches (low-ceiling diuretics, thiazides), and submarket C10A has the highest number of observations. Table 3 about here   Table 3 reports the patent applications by 3-digit class and year and compares them to the average number of products offered for purchase in the period. The C10A-class has the highest number of patents, even though its average number of products is among the smallest. Table 4 shows the number of entries by company; only two companies in our sample launched more than ten products.
Variables and Model
The panel-probit model is a natural tool with which to analyse the Entry event, as defined in section 3. Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Hendricks, Piccione and Tan (1997) and Netz and Taylor (2002), we adopted a standard entry-exit reduced-form model and analyzed the probability of an entry decision as a function of firm-specific and submarket-specific regressors.
Our variables include company characteristics like exit choices (Exit)-that is, the decision to reduce the number of products the company offers in a submarket; several indicators calculated on the basis of the company's size that measure the its positioning in the global pharmaceutical market and in each submarket; and the company's own patents and those of its competitors, both of which lie at the core of our analysis. The measure of the stock of patents held by a firm in a submarket is calculated as past patented ideas using the perpetual inventory method for each company in each 3-digit ATC submarket. The stock of patents is built as follows:
where P (t-1) is the number of patents at time t-1, g is the average growth rate in patenting (firmand submarket-specific), and δ is the depreciation, which is assumed to be 0.15, as is common Data on total prescription drug expenditures comes from National Health Expenditure Accounts (NHEA) 17 , expressed in nominal terms and not adjusted to remove the impact of changes in healthcare prices. Although a price index for personal healthcare goods and services is available, 16 We ran the same model using patents weighted by families, but the results were not statistically significant. 17 Data are available at: https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/StatisticsTrends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html there is no corresponding price index for the aggregate national health expenditure (NHE), so the data are transformed in real terms using the US consumer price index (CPI). The differences in the NHE's annual growth rates reflect trends in the factors that affect healthcare spending, including technological developments and changes in the population's composition by age and sex (demographic effect), the use of healthcare goods and services, and prices for healthcare goods and services. Finally, the launch of new pharmaceutical products is a long process that requires the company to make many decisions internal to the company and to run through many phases of authorization. The decision to launch a product is the last step of a long, dynamic process that begins with an R&D expenditure, so all of the explanatory variables in the model present a one-period lag to minimize loss of information while also showing the dynamic of the R&D process. Therefore, we employ the regressors described in Table 5 . Table 5 about here   Table 6 reports the main descriptive statistics for the variables used. Table 6 about here   5 Model specification
Given the definition of the entry decision described in Section 4, our dependent variable Entry is represented by a dummy variable yij,t, which takes the value of 1 if firm i decides to launch a new product into submarket j at time t, and zero otherwise. We used a probit model to analyze the role of patents on the firm's entry decision:
where (z) is the cdf of the N(0,1) distribution, and ci is the unobserved heterogeneity.
One well known method with which to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity is to include a set of subject-specific parameters ci (e.g. Halaby, 2004; Wooldridge, 2005 Wooldridge, , 2010 Wooldridge, , 2011 ) that can be treated as fixed or random. The use of fixed effects could lead to the incidental parameters problem so, given our sample size, it may be preferable to a spare degree of freedom. As
Wooldridge (2010, p. 286) pointed out, if the key explanatory variables do not vary much over time, a fixed effect estimator can lead to an imprecise estimate-that is, it can have greater variance. Moreover, the assumption of normal distribution for ci allows us to evaluate the population average effect (APE) (Wooldridge, 2010) .
These considerations and the nature of the available data suggest a random effect probit model.
We used STATA14 to obtain maximum likelihood estimates through the adaptive Gauss- The resulting specification is:
In particular, as in Wooldridge (2005), we assume that and we use a linear specification for the conditional expectation. In our case, the endogenous variables that enter with their initial conditions are:
Finally, since the growth rate of the real total prescription drug expenditures per capita is constant across units, that variable plays the role of a time dummy.
Results
We used our results, collected in Table 7 , to determine the effects of a firm's own patents and those of its rivals on the probability that the firm will launch new products and found that the firm's own patents promote the chances of entry, while rivals' patents have a two-fold effect:
their initial stock of patents (OCitj;0) has a negative effect on entry, while their most recent patents (Ocitj;t-1) have a positive effect. The negative effect of the initial level of patents cannot be considered a standard barrier to entry because the pharmaceutical sector does not usually feature competition among branded products so much as competition between branded and generic products 19 . This result can be interpreted more as "fear of competition" than as a standard barrier to entry.
The positive effect of rivals' most recent patents (Ocitj;t-1) on the probability that a firm will launch new products can be explained by the flow of knowledge to potential competitors and the opening of new technological opportunities: in this case, the patents' "spillover effect" prevails.
In other words, our results suggest that the rivals' patents in the initial period are a potential threat to launches of new products, but over time the dissemination and the disclosure effects of rivals' newer patents prevails. Our research uses a one-period lag for all patents held by competitors and the firm, thereby capturing the dissemination effect of knowledge better than the disclosure effect does.
Although it should be better to have a lag of ten years when measuring the disclosure effect of patents (DeNicolò, 2007), taking this advice into account is impossible with the time span covered by our available sample period without losing a great deal of information. Our view is that the estimated effect of a firm's patents can be seen as a dissemination effect more than as the opening of new technological opportunities. The number of competing firms (IMpj;t-1) is not significant, while the number of competing products (Comprodj;t-1) has a double effect. The lagged number of products that competitors have in a submarket is negative and significant, and it takes the role of a barrier to entry, while the initial number of competing products is positively significant. This result suggests that, although the initial number of competitors' products could be considered a proxy for a submarket's attractiveness, the number of competing products later becomes a disincentive to launching additional products.
The measure of each submarket's attractiveness (Apj;t-1), given by the relative weight of each submarket over the entire pharmaceutical sector, is not significant.
Since the decision to patent in many markets is determined by the behavior of all competitors, the need arises to control for each submarket's attractiveness. The presence of many patents in some submarkets seems to be a sort of emulation process among companies (e.g. Bloom,
Schankerman and Van Reenen, 2013).
The growth rate of the prescription drug expenditures per capita (PcExt-1), which expresses the dynamics of pharmaceutical demand in the US, is not significant. This result is in contrast to Acemoglu and Linn (2004) , who found a significantly positive market size.
Our estimates show that the regressors DG and DS, which measure the relative size of each company in the pharmaceutical market and in each submarket, respectively, and are used to capture the predation effect by incumbents, have no effect. Table 7 about here Table 8 about here Table 8 shows the Average Marginal Effects (AME) and the elasticities. Competitive products' elasticity indicates that they are a deterrent to launching additional products, while incumbents' patents have positive elasticity.
Conclusions
This paper presents an analysis of patents' impact on competition, where competition is measured by the probability that a firm will launch an additional product. Our results show that a interest in oncological products and those for autoimmune diseases. However, the paper's case study is sufficiently general that it doesn't depend on whether the period of investigation is recent or more distant.
Our results show that incumbents' patents can have either positive or negative effects on entry.
Incumbents' initial successes in exploiting existing technological opportunities can frustrate entrant's efforts and, thus, discourage entry, as suggested by the patent literature (Aoki, 1991) and Kyle (2007) , who found that rivals' patents induce a sort of fear of competition. On the other hand, incumbents' most recent patent holdings appear to promote entry, suggesting that new information flows to competitors through patents and opens new technological opportunities for them. In this case, the "spillover effect" prevails, showing a dissemination effect.
Our research also finds a double effect of competitor's patents: a spillover effect and a barrierto-entry effect. The lagged number of products offered by competing incumbents in each submarket.
IMpj;t-1
The lagged number of competing incumbent companies in each submarket, as a measure of competition.
PcExt-1
The growth rate of the per-capita real total prescription drug expenditures in US in the period considered. Since this variable is constant across units, it plays the roles of time dummies. Apj;t- 1 The attractiveness of each submarket given by the ratio of the total sales in submarket j to the total sales in the whole market. DGi;t-1
The relative distance between company i's sales and those of the company with the largest sales in the whole market, lagged at time t.
DGi;t= DSij;t-1 1, the relative distance between company i's sales and those of the company with the largest sales in the submarket j, lagged at time t-1: DSij;t= 
